

## Agency Information

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CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA  
CONTROL OF CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF GUERRILLAS  
AND ARMS  
EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION  
SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL  
AND CULTURAL MISSIONS  
STRENGTHENING OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY  
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Review Date 12/14/15 By Walt Galt

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
Upgrading and  
Declassification

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished by him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with [redacted]

[redacted] indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of the Congress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica ~~had~~ presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Havana-Moscou route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least

until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the ~~Government~~ <sup>AN GOVERNMENT</sup> of Brazil over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubans as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be

returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CSA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CSA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CSA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed U.S. Missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew its scheduled Curacao-Havana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Havana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor

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indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with R.M.C.

b. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 10 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American <sup>A</sup> Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Havana to New York.

1. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable GOVT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago

urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegates to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Insability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to the VII UIA Congress in Havana, September 29-October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a ~~commercial~~ basis, that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

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2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cuban flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cuban flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the month of July at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which

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was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Havana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who participate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

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4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies.

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Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in these countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (CONUSNAVSOC) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.

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Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CCUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CCUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisers. Presently there are such advisers assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-subversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

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1. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion  
Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident

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brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions.

Central Intelligence Agency

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Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

9. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Levalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

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c. Reassured President Schick of Nicaragua in the most emphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty did not mean that our attitude toward Castro has altered in the slightest, and stressed our interest in seeing steady progress by all the Isthmian countries in implementing the recommendations of the Managua Security Conference to block Cuban subversive efforts.

d. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 26 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments in the hourly newscasts.

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b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorian Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in and Honduras, Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports estimates on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on

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three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

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